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Abstract 
This article challenges the use of cognitive-behavioural psychological models 
underpinning many of the dominant and popular accounts of emotion in the 
neurosciences. Acknowledging that neurobiology is important for any 
understanding of emotion, an alternative model of neuropsychology is sought in 
the work of theorists of the cultural-historical school, particularly A. N. Leontyev 
and A. R. Luria. The importance of their work in stressing the key role of 
intentional social activity, culture, and language in the formation of human 
neuropsychological functions is developed into a theory of emotions that can 
provide an alternative for emotion studies. In this theory, activity, culture, 
history, and individual ontogeny play the defining role in structuring the 
neurobiological systems that underlie emotions, as opposed to the evolution of 
behaviours that are hard-wired into the brain and function as automatic 
responses. Instead, it is understood that there is a continuum between evolution 
and human social and cultural development. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years a growing body of literature has started to develop positive 
criticisms of neuroscience, suggesting alternative conceptual models of the brain 
that seek to influence the impact of neuroscience on psychology. In particular, 
these critical alternatives are concerned with what neuroscience tends to ignore 
– the role that culture and social activity plays in shaping the neurobiology of the 
brain (Kitayama and Uskul, 2011; Choudhury and Slaby, 2012). As Choudhury 
and Slaby say in the introduction to their edited collection Critical Neuroscience, 
‘the goal is to work towards an integrated approach to behaviour that situates 
the brain and cognition in the body, the social milieu, and the political world’ 
(2012, p. 3). I aim to contribute to that goal here, but with specific reference to 
the influence neuroscience has had on the understanding of emotions. In 
developing an alternative approach to neuroscience than that contained in many 
contemporary studies of emotion, I draw on the relatively neglected work of the 
cultural-historical school, especially A. N. Leontyev and A. R. Luria. Influenced by 
the thinking of Vygotsky (1987), both Leontyev (1981) and Luria (1966; 1973) 
always maintained that social activity, especially in the form of labour and 
linguistic communication, played an essential part in the formation of human 
consciousness and emotion. Their view was that the neurobiological and 
neuropsychological formation of consciousness in organisms is based on their 
activity, and that in humans the ‘higher’ psychological processes are formed in 
activity mediated by tool use. The category of ‘tools’, however, includes not only 
instruments fashioned to transform nature, but also signs that are used in social 
communication – symbols, images, words, and other artefacts that compose 
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human language and culture – and which reform human neuropsychology. This 
has profound implications for our understanding of consciousness and emotion. 
Here, I will use this theoretical framework to create an understanding of emotion 
as historically and culturally developed, as is the neurobiological patterning of 
the brain on which thinking and feeling is dependent, but by which it is not 
determined. Before I do this, though, I will briefly consider some accounts of 
emotions in the neurosciences that I am contrasting this theory with. 
 
2. Neuroscience and the Evolution of Emotion 
One powerful and popular strand of thinking in neuroscience understands 
emotion as generated by neural systems that have formed in humans and other 
species throughout the course of their evolution (LeDoux, 1999; Lang, 2014). For 
these thinkers, attempts to understand the phenomenal experience of emotions 
in humans – say, for example, the feeling of fear with its raised heartbeat, sweaty 
hands, and desperate desire to escape – is a red herring, as emotion is generated 
by brain mechanism that have detected the object of emotion and begun to 
produce its behavioural response before we are aware of feeling anything. Thus 
emotion is the result of the initially unconscious processing going on in brain 
systems, while feeling is the conscious awareness of emotion that arises only in 
certain circumstances (LeDoux, 1999; Damasio, 2000). Emotions, then, are 
produced by brain mechanisms or systems that have evolved for survival and are 
connected to the homeostatic regulation of the body. Cognitive processes can 
also trigger the brain mechanisms that generate emotions, as they provide 
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signals or thoughts that act as stimuli, just as emotionally relevant signals in the 
environment do. Cognition also allows humans some leeway for conscious 
agency, as it gives us the capacity to attempt to regulate emotion or decide what 
to do after we have consciously become aware of our feelings, but it is not the 
source of emotion itself. 
This behavioural and cognitive model of emotion shows up most strongly in 
Damasio’s work. Here, the emotionally competent stimuli, which trigger the 
homeostatic regulatory neural mechanisms that produce emotional responses, 
can come from three sources: 1) the external ‘environment’; 2) the visceral 
inside of the body, as in the way low blood sugar levels may cause hunger; or 3) 
‘from the “mental” inside’ (Damasio, 1995, p. 117), say, from the mental 
representation of a threating object or situation that causes fear. Thus for 
Damasio, as for LeDoux, emotions are largely behavioural responses instigated 
by innate brain mechanisms that are triggered automatically with the 
appearance of the competent environmental or cognitive stimulus. In Damasio’s 
(1995) early work, the distinction between ‘primary emotions’, which are largely 
innate and appear in early infancy, and ‘secondary emotions’ that emerge in 
adult life, seemed to allow for the possibility of learning and cultural variation of 
the emotions. However, he later claimed that secondary emotions are also 
largely pre-set by biology, so that ‘notwithstanding the reality that learning and 
culture alter the expression of emotions and give emotions new meanings, 
emotions are biologically determined processes, depending on innately set brain 
devices, laid down by a long evolutionary history’ (Damasio, 2000, p. 51). 
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Because of this, a wide range of living organisms have emotions, including 
relatively simple ones that lack the brain regions and functions to experience or 
realise that they are having an emotion – in Damasio’s terms, to feel the emotion. 
Instead, ‘all they require is a simple perceptual apparatus – a filter to detect the 
emotionally competent stimulus and the capacity to emote’: which is, ‘to respond 
to them [the stimuli] with an emotion’ (Damasio, 2004, p. 50). 
However, one of the central problems with this understanding of emotions in 
neuroscience is the lack of recognition of the social, cultural and historical world 
within which the human species acts. As the neuroscientist Steven Rose has 
pointed out, because the human brain is thought to have taken on its modern 
form in the Pleistocene period, probably around 250,000 years ago, many 
neurobiologists and evolutionary psychologists assume that little of fundamental 
importance has changed since. Thus, behavioural patterns laid down then and 
hardwired into the brain – including emotional responses – remain essentially 
the same today upon encountering the required stimulus. Yet this ignores the 
fundamental importance of cultural history and the unique development of each 
individual within history and society (Rose, 2005; 2006). If we take this seriously 
it means, for Rose, that many ‘brain mechanisms’ are not innate and unchanging, 
but that… 
 
…during development certain critical or sensitive periods occur during 
which the brain is specifically primed to respond to environmental 
context and in doing so to acquire particular capacities or behaviours. 
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During such periods particular relevant brain regions exhibit great 
plasticity, modifying their structure and connectivity in response to 
experience – for example, visual or linguistic (Rose, 2006, p. 115). 
 
Rose goes on to say that depending on the culture, different behaviours are 
developed in children and at different times of life, requiring varied skills and 
capacities that only emerge in particular cultural contexts. Within these contexts, 
synaptic connections of the brain are moulded, sharpened, or pruned away as 
children act in response to the external social world, especially through the 
guidance of, and engagement with, other people. Furthermore, human thought 
and activity can change without corresponding changes in neurobiology, as in 
the way consciousness has been fundamentally altered by science, art, and 
politics, changing not only the way we think about the world but also the way we 
act within it. From my perspective here, this means that other forms of 
behaviour, such as the emotional, is also fundamentally altered by culture and 
history. 
For a neuroscientist like Damasio, however, everything is centred on the 
embodied brain, which is understood not only to induce emotion but also to 
produce conscious thoughts by manipulating mental imagery. Beyond the brain 
there seems to be little more than a collection of stimuli that compose the 
external ‘environment’, but nothing that resembles a meaningful social and 
historical world in which humans act intentionally. It is this latter milieu that 
concerned the thinkers of the cultural-historical school in their attempt to situate 
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evolutionary neurobiological changes within the context of activity in a world 
that is, for humans, social and cultural. 
 
3. The Evolution of the Brain in Activity: Mind, Consciousness and Emotion 
One of the central tenets that links the thinking of a modern neuroscientist like 
Rose with the earlier thinking of activity theorists such as Leontyev and Luria, is 
a resistance to reducing the ‘mind’ or consciousness to the internal workings of 
the brain, separated from the activity of humans in the world. Instead, the ‘mind’ 
is seen as inseparable from activity, which relates us to the things and objects of 
interest in the social world, and the emotions are also integral to this. However, 
activity has a specific meaning to the thinkers of the cultural-historical school, 
such as Leontyev. Following Marx and Engels (1970), human activity is 
understood as structured by the social relations humans enter into to produce 
the means of subsistence, satisfying our needs (which thereafter become 
historical needs). The tools that human groups create in order to produce are the 
medium through which we are related to, and gain a degree of mastery over, 
objects and nature. Alongside these, signs and language are the tools and the 
medium through which we organise social relations and activities. It must be 
noted at this point, though, that the term ‘language’ means something very 
specific to members of the cultural-historical school. As Bruner points out, for 
Vygotsky and those influenced by him, language is not to be understood in 
Saussure’s (1974) terms as a system of signs, but instead language is a powerful 
system of tools for use – initially in speech, ‘but increasingly and once 
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inwardness is achieved, in perception, in memory, in thought and imagination’ 
(Bruner, 1987, p. 15). As Leontyev (1981) puts it, language is the store for 
humankind’s socio-historical experience of practice – an array of symbolic 
meanings – but speech is the use of language as a tool of communication that 
changes both human activity and neuropsychology. Thus, tool and language use 
are the two mediums of human relations and interactions, and it is through these 
activities that we appropriate the social heritage psychologically. As Leontyev 
says; 
 
A tool mediates activity that connects a person not only with the world of 
objects but also with other people. This means that a person’s activity 
assimilates the experience of humanity. It means that a person’s mental 
processes (the ‘higher mental functions’) acquire a structure necessarily 
linked to socio-historically formed means and modes, which are 
transmitted to him by other people through team-work and social 
intercourse. But to transmit a means or a mode for carrying out some 
process can be done only in external form – in the form of action or in the 
form of external speech. In other words, the higher and specifically 
human processes can arise only through mutual interaction of person 
with person, as interpsychological processes, which only later come to be 
carried out by the individual independently (Leontyev, 1972, p. 19, 
emphasis in original). 
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For the cultural-historical school, then, the notion of ‘culture’ also has a very 
different meaning from that expressed today in some branches of cultural 
neuroscience. For example, Kitayama and Uskul (2011) define culture ‘in terms 
of values (general goal states) and practices (behavioural routines often 
designed to achieve the values) that are collectively distributed and, to some 
important extent, shared’ (p. 421). These practices entail scripted behavioural 
sequences that can powerfully shape and modify brain pathways, accumulating 
the effects of cultural experience. In contrast to this, as Ratner (2000) points out, 
for the cultural-historical school, culture consists in practical, socially organised 
activity, so it is not confined to the more traditional definitions of culture 
involving values and beliefs. And as Leontyev (1981) shows, this activity centres 
on labour and language that is socially meaningful, forming interpsychological 
processes that become intrapsychological. It is this social activity and the 
historical consciousness it creates that shapes the neural interconnectivity of the 
brain and nervous system through the development of each individual. 
This is important for the understanding of emotion, because for Leontyev 
emotional experience only emerges in historical activity with the development of 
the human mind. Here, emotions are ‘crystallised’ in the object of emotional 
experience so that every act takes on an emotional colouring. Although the 
emotions are crystallised externally and objectively in actions, interactions, and 
social relations, they become ‘motives-stimuli’ for individual persons (Leontyev, 
1978). This is different from the stimulus-response model fundamental to 
cognitive-behavioural theories of emotion, because in activity theory the motives 
for specific actions are part of an overall pattern of social relations and activities 
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that have a symbolic or linguistic meaning for participants. Therefore, behaviour 
is not understood as generated by forces of cause and effect, but instead activity 
is motivated through social meanings and intentional activity. This does not 
mean that the motives-stimuli, including emotions, must be consciously 
articulated or aimed at a specific goal. It means that the motives-stimuli find 
their psychical reflection in the emotional colouring of the act. A practical 
example of Leontyev’s theory of emotion can be seen in Roth’s (2007) study of 
workers at a salmon hatchery. This illustrates how actions performed by 
workers in their jobs expresses emotion, identity, and practical reasoning. 
However, this only has meaning and sense in terms of the goals of the overall 
unit of activity within the workplace to which specific actions, and feelings, are 
oriented. 
Given this, the ideas of the cultural-historical school have implications for the 
understanding of the behaviour of other animals and organisms, in terms of 
whether or not they have emotions.  For Leontyev (1981) the simplest living 
organisms exhibit irritability in relation to their environment, which is to say 
they respond in some way to certain elements in their milieu. This is true of even 
the most basic organisms that, as Damasio (2004) said, have merely a simple 
perceptive filter to detect elements in their environment. However, for Leontyev, 
their responses are not emotions, nor at this stage are they even to be thought of 
as sensations. Sensitivity only arises in more complex organisms that have some 
awareness of what they are sensitive to. Following this, the awareness of 
separate sensations comes even later, with organisms whose sensitivity has 
become differentiated because their activity is more complex. For example, a 
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more complex life form like a frog becomes sensitive to certain sounds in its life-
world, like rustling grass, which may indicate the movement of an insect that can 
provide a meal. Even then the sound must be coordinated with other sensations, 
such as visual cues and movement, before the animal is certain of what the 
rustling in the grass indicates and how it should respond – is it an insect in the 
grass that can be eaten or a threat that necessitates avoidance? Sensations, then, 
are important in orienting the activity of more sophisticated organisms, because 
they provide a signalling function that adapts activity to the environment. 
According to Leontyev (1981) this means that even for those animals whose 
behaviour is largely instinctive, their activity must always be malleable to some 
degree in order to adapt to quickly changing environmental conditions or simply 
to respond to rapidly changing situations. Most of the more highly developed life 
forms, such as mammals, have some capacity for flexible and learned behaviours 
that are required by immediate and sometimes unusual or unexpected 
occurrences. For humans, this is much more the case than in other animals 
because our behaviour is less reliant on instinct and much more on the 
technology and language of our culture. This is something that is stored 
externally in our social heritage and has to be learned and mastered by 
succeeding generations. For example, a pilot flying an aeroplane does not rely 
solely on inherited organs of sensitivity to fly the craft, but on invented devices 
like radar systems in order to navigate course; she must also learn how to use 
and interpret the information provided by such instruments in order to fly the 
plane safely to its destination. Additionally, she must communicate with ground 
staff, such as those in air traffic control, so that the plane can be navigated to its 
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destination in coordination with all the other aircraft in the vicinity. To do all this 
successfully, the pilot has to have sensations like other animals, such as sight, 
hearing, and touch: however, these sensations are now converted into 
perception, which is the ability to reflect on the external environment and 
coordinate a range of sensations and actions in terms of their overall meanings 
and goals. In humans there also emerges the intellect, which is dependent on the 
stocks of knowledge needed to perform various operations in human activity. 
The ability to fly a plane rests on conscious knowledge of geography and 
navigation techniques, computing, and the mechanics of flight and piloting. Thus, 
our pilot must master a range of instruments and have knowledge of how to 
operate and read them. She also must have constant communication with ground 
staff, co-pilots, cabin crew, and passengers, to fly the plane successfully. This 
activity is directed and oriented within social relations and mediated by 
technology and language. 
The point I want to make here, using Leontyev’s work, is this: in passing from 
acting in the environment through irritability, then sensation, and then with 
perception and intellect, organisms go through various stages in the organisation 
of activity. Life that is organised through irritability and sensation relies to 
varying degrees on behaviours that have been passed on through the 
generations by biological hereditary, with some learning involved, whereas 
human activity is directed by social and cultural goals and relies on assimilation 
– the learning and mastery of external tools in ontogeny that have been invented 
by human groups; specifically, technologies and language. In this approach, 
activity does not operate according to the direct causal relationship between 
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stimulus and response but is mediated by tools and signs, and thus is 
meaningfully oriented towards objects and ends in a social world. Emotion does 
not belong in the realm of irritability or even in that of sensation, but instead 
emotion in the human sense of the term emerges in meaningful, linguistic, 
intentional activity. 
To return to our pilot on the aeroplane, she and her crew must also communicate 
emotionally to the passengers, particularly that all is safe and well and that they 
are in the hands of skilled professionals who will get them safely to their 
destination. This involves not only the management of individual emotions 
(Hochschild, 1983) – the control of rising fear and panic by individual crew 
members if something seems to be going wrong on the flight – but also the 
collective management of emotion on the aircraft. By doing this, the crew aim to 
make passengers feel safe and comfortable on the flight and, even in an 
emergency, attempt to contain any panic, especially if an evacuation of the craft 
is possible. Thus, as Roth (2007) showed, the actions of the crew will be coloured 
by emotion as they play their part in the overall activity of safely flying an 
aeroplane. In this, their emotions and practical reasoning are integral to the 
actions necessary to achieve a safe flight, actions which also express the norms of 
their profession. 
But this turns the central idea of reductive neuroscience on its head. From the 
viewpoint of activity theory, the phenomenal emotions and feelings we have 
result from our activity in the world, and this structures neurobiology rather 
than being the result of it. Activity theorists developed this idea when working 
with patients who had sustained some form of brain damage, noting that in 
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having to relearn how to perform many of the activities of everyday life, different 
regions and functions of the brain would be used to compensate for areas that 
had been damaged. In other words, brain regions and functions worked together 
in a larger functional unity to allow humans to perform actions, and when some 
regions and functions got damaged others would be employed in a new 
functional unity to allow the person to achieve certain actions and goals. This 
meant that activity theorists formed a view of the brain very similar to that of 
modern neuroscientists like Rose (2006), in that neural functioning is seen to 
depend not on isolated brain functions or systems, but upon how the various 
systems work together to form larger patterns of neural interconnectivity. As 
Leontyev puts it, psychic (or mental) functions… 
 
…are not based on the functioning of some isolated group of cortical cells 
or other, but rather on a complex brain system, whose elements are 
located in different zones of the brain often far apart, but which, however, 
form a single constellation (Leontyev, 1981, p. 322). 
 
Furthermore, these neurological systems are formed not simply in an 
evolutionary sense, according to activity that was happening in the human group 
hundreds of thousands of years ago, but can be formed and re-formed according 
to social and historical activity that is current – as in compensation after brain 
damage, where brain systems can be re-organised to perform activities. Also, as 
noted by Rose (2006), the consciousness of humans operates not only according 
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to biological laws but also to socio-historical ones. This means that ‘the brain 
includes not certain, specially human capacities of some kind or another, but 
only the capacity to form these capacities’ (Leontyev, 1981, p. 154). Thus the 
capacity to speak a particular language or to know the current science of physical 
laws is not given by the brain at birth; what is given is the capacity to learn and 
master such capacities in homes, schools and universities. This is the formation 
of human consciousness, governed not by pre-set brain processes but by socio-
historical development and, within this, the skills and capacities mastered in the 
ontogeny of each individual. 
For Leontyev, then, and as we will see for Luria too, what is central to the 
formation of human consciousness – and with it the formation of feeling and 
emotion – is speech and other symbolic forms of activity, for it is within such 
forms of communication that historical consciousness is developed. 
 
4. A. R. Luria: Action, Speech and Emotion 
Luria’s (1966; 1973) thinking on neuropsychology is shaped by the same 
influences as Leontyev’s, centred on the importance of activity and language, 
which he contrasts to other approaches in psychology: 
 
The basic difference between our approach and that of traditional 
psychology will be that we are not seeking the origins of human 
consciousness in the depths of the ‘soul’ or in the independently acting 
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mechanisms of the brain (where we shall find nothing). Rather, we are 
operating in an entirely different sphere – in humans’ actual relationship 
with reality, in their social history, which is closely tied to labour and 
language (Luria, 1981, pp. 27-28). 
 
Again, though, it is important to emphasize that with the term language, Luria is 
using it in the Vygotskian sense as a system of tools for use, both in speech and 
as an internal tool for organising human mental processes and coordinating 
brain functions. In Luria’s approach, the brain is seen as a ‘working brain’, 
meaning that it is understood to be part of a body located in the world and its 
function is to achieve tasks – it literally works to achieve the goals of human 
activity, which are social and historical. We achieve these activities through 
tools, such as work tools, memory aids, and speech, but these are not just 
external tools: the mastery and use of them re-shapes brain functions, which are 
seen as dynamic functional systems that change with development. As with 
Leontyev, no area or function of the brain is understood as working in isolation; 
instead they all work as part of an overall system. Speech and other symbolic 
forms are a key element in this because they are the primary external tools or 
mediators through which human activity is coordinated and organised in a social 
and cultural world. Thus, speech is central to the higher mental functions 
because at the point when it begins to be mastered and internalised in early 
childhood, it becomes the organising principle not only in human activity but 
also for mental and neural processes. For example, when we master speech as 
children, we no longer perceive and remember purely through visual cues, but 
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these are now merged with words. We see with words as much as with our eyes 
because the visual and language centres in the brain are working as a functional 
unit, which is the result of years of developmental activity. In perceiving objects, 
say, we do not see shiny things travelling in space, but cars or lorries moving 
down a road, and we understand the use and meaning of these objects in our 
society. This shows tools, symbols, and words as… 
 
… external aids or historically formed devices [that] are essential elements 
in the establishment of functional connections between individual parts of 
the brain, and that by their aid, areas of the brain which previously were 
independent become the components of a single functional system … 
historically formed measures for the organization of human behaviour tie 
new knots in the activity of man’s brain (Luria, 1973, p. 31, emphasis in 
original). 
 
These ideas of Luria’s have echoes in contemporary theories known as the 
‘extended mind’ thesis (Clark, 2008), in which cognitive processes are not seen 
as existing simply in the head but are reliant on devices in the environment that 
enable humans to achieve mental tasks. They are also similar to the ‘enactive’ 
approach to cognition and neuroscience, in which cognition is not understood as 
the representation of sensory information constructed by areas or systems in the 
brain, but instead is seen in the context of the organism’s active engagement with 
its world (Noë, 2004). Colombetti (2014) has taken this enactive approach to the 
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mind and applied it to affect and emotion. In her approach, affect is inextricably 
bound up with mental processes and both are brought forth in the living 
organism by virtue of its specific organisation and its interaction with the 
environment. In this respect there is a great similarity with the work of activity 
theorists like Leontyev and Luria. Colombetti also understands the interaction of 
more basic organisms with their world to be based in sensitivity or sensation – 
which she subsumes under the term ‘affect’ – rather than fully formed emotions. 
However, where this approach differs from activity theory is that it is based in 
dynamical systems theory, which understands organisms to be self-organising: 
that is, in response to organism-environment interactions a complex system – 
such as the neural system and other organic processes – can ‘generate and 
maintain structured order within itself by way of mutual influences among its 
components’ (Colombetti, 2014, p. 55). However, this approach centres on the 
self-organisation of an individual organism as it interacts with its world. The 
point that activity theorists are making, especially with respect to a social species 
like humans whose activities are structured by group organisation and by 
symbolic communication, is that organic and neural systems come under the 
direction of social processes and so, at the very most, could only be considered as 
semi-autonomous systems that are not completely self-organising. Instead, their 
organisation is directed from outside, extrinsically, from the socio-historical 
world. 
An example from Luria’s work is that of movement, which in humans becomes 
‘voluntary’ once it comes under the control of intentional activity organised by 
speech. This involves what Luria (1973) calls ‘kinaesthetic afferentation’, which 
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is the system of kinaesthetic impulses reaching the brain from the moving limbs. 
A chain of consecutive movements with a temporal course makes up an action 
that eventually becomes a single ‘kinaesthetic melody’ that can be repeated. In 
many animals these movements are controlled to varying degrees by instinctive 
behaviours that are determined by inborn programmes, while for humans 
operating at the level of conscious (if not always self-conscious) action they are 
dictated by intentions formed within speech and other symbolic systems. Even if 
these active, intentional movements acquire the automatism of the instincts, as 
in habits for example, they are still qualitatively different because they are 
organised by linguistically based, meaningful systems of activity and oriented to 
goals – what Luria calls a ‘kinetic bodily logos’. An example of this in young 
children would be learning handwriting, a process in which children are first 
taught to form individual letters on a page, then to join them up into words, and 
eventually to use this technique freely and spontaneously, expressing them 
selves in handwriting on a page. Here, a chain of actions is first learned by 
mastering each action in the chain, then by practising joining up these actions 
and forming them as a kinaesthetic melody – the ability to spontaneously do 
handwriting. Once again, though, this is guided by an overall social activity, in 
this case learning how to communicate using the language of one’s culture, a 
processes in which the action of handwriting is but one part. 
Thus, for Luria, the old idea of movement as an act of volition was replaced by 
behaviourism, which understood behaviour as reflex action formed through the 
direct causal chain of stimulus and response. However, these models of activity 
must now be replaced, certainly for humans, by an intentional model of 
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voluntary movement or ‘motor’ task, and this is formed in speech acts. Luria says 
that ‘by fixing the intentions and formulating programmes of activity, speech 
becomes at the same time a method of regulating behaviour and setting the 
course of mental processes’ (1973, p. 307). For him this means that: 
 
The higher forms of mental processes have a particularly complex 
structure; they are laid down during ontogeny… As a rule they are based 
on a series of external aids, such as language, the digital system of 
counting, formed in the process of social history, they are mediated by 
them, and cannot in general be perceived without their participation… 
they are always connected with reflection of the outside world in full 
activity, and their conception loses all its meaning if it is considered apart 
from this fact (Luria, 1973, pp. 30-31). 
 
This has profound implications for the understanding of feeling and emotion, for 
now we can no longer see emotion as operating according to a stimulus-
response mechanism of action and movement. Just as movement is a kinetic 
bodily logos operating according to intentional activity that is socially and 
culturally oriented through symbolic and linguistic meanings, so too must feeling 
and emotion operate in the same way, because all activity and movement has 
some element of feeling or emotion in it, just as it has an element of reason 
(Freeman, 2000). And just as all forms of perception and movement are now 
integrated with language – so that we rarely see or hear anything we cannot 
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name, and if we do we immediately struggle to begin to identify it – so too is 
emotion. Feeling and emotion is part of intentional, linguistically based human 
activity and cannot be properly understood separately from it. I will fully justify 
this is the final section here. 
However, there are two modifications needed to Luria’s work to bring it into line 
with contemporary research: the first is related to neuroscience, the second to 
do with the way he conceptualised emotion. First, Luria sees the functional 
networks of the brain as hierarchical in their structure so that the higher 
functions tend to take charge of the lower ones, reorganising their functioning. 
However, in contemporary neuroscience the relation between working units of 
the brain is not understood as a strict hierarchy. Instead, neuroscientists see 
brain functioning as involving a ‘neural heterarchy’, which ‘contains the 
components of hierarchical systems, as higher levels are in continuous 
communication with lower level systems via intermediate levels, but have the 
additional capacity to interact over widely separated levels via direct 
connections’ (Norman et al., 2014, p. 120). This means that entirely new systems 
are formed within the heterarchy creating what Freeman (2000) calls a global 
dynamic framework. Approaches such as this in contemporary neuroscience 
have broken down the idea that the brain can be divided into the ‘lower’ (older) 
emotional regions and the ‘higher’ cognitive ones (formed later in evolution). In 
a neural heterachy the brain regions traditionally viewed as emotional are also 
involved in cognition, and vice versa (Pessoa, 2008), meaning that the system is 
one of continual mutual influence and open to restructuring. However, this only 
strengthens the aims and findings of the cultural-historical school into the way 
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that new functional or global dynamic frameworks of neural interconnectivity 
can be created through engagement in activity. Exploring this style of 
neuroscience could provide new avenues of research for cultural-historical 
thinkers. 
Second, when it came to his work on emotion Luria (1932) did not learn his own 
lesson in respect of how other neuropsychological functions – such as 
perception, memory, and movement – are modulated and changed through 
symbolic communication and activity. Instead, he saw emotion as a lower level 
function that needed regulating by the higher functions. Without regulation 
emotion has a disruptive, pathological effect on the overall psyche. Therefore he 
understood affective processes as playing a role only in the disturbance of the 
linguistically organised ‘higher’ processes of activity, centred on cognitive 
rational systems of thought. In fact, affect only appears when the normal motor 
discharge of impulses is disrupted. This comes perilously close to the view 
rejected by modern neuroscience – that the newer and higher mental functions 
and neural systems are largely cognitive and rational, while the older systems 
are more emotional and irrational. Instead, in a neural heterarchy, both lower 
and higher functions are cognitive and emotional, and are transformed in their 
functioning when they become part of a new global dynamic system. Towards 
the end of his book on emotion, Luria does get closer to an understanding of 
emotion that would be more in line with this, saying that: 
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Every symbolic system may be a powerful means of organizing affect. 
This can be proved by the part that symbolic systems as images have 
played in the history of culture; they are connected with emotions and 
widely employed in art, in the theatre, etc., to organize affect (1932, p. 
423). 
 
Additionally, Luria did experiments using hypnosis to show ‘that the affective 
behaviour takes on a new structure after the introduction of symbolic forms’ 
(1932, p. 423). This only confirms what Ratner (2000) has to say about the 
transformation of lower into higher functions through social activity and 
interaction: 
 
It transforms lower processes into higher psychological functions by (a) 
dispensing with many natural processes, (b) modifying (pacifying, 
civilising) certain natural processes by incorporating them into new 
systems, and (c) generating novel psychological functions which have no 
natural analogue or basis (p. 24). 
 
And this is the exact point that I want to make here: that feeling and emotion are 
not simply basic forms of human responses, produced by brain mechanisms that 
evolved thousands of years ago, but are socially and historically structured 
under the influence of culturally mediated symbolic and linguistic forms. 
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However, I do think that after these criticisms are taken into account, Luria’s 
approach as demonstrated in his work on other neural functions – like 
perception, memory, and movement – can still be used to show how feeling and 
emotion is restructured, modulated and created through symbolic and linguistic 
activity. 
 
5. Discussion 
One of the key things to be drawn from the work of the cultural-historical school 
is that emotion is not to be thought of as the expression of a natural response, 
triggered by an emotionally competent stimulus, but is an expression integral to 
an action, which takes its meaning and sense from the patterns of activity and 
social relations in society. As Gergen has said in his own relational 
understanding of emotions, ‘[t]hey are forms of action that acquire their 
intelligibility within relationships, and they gain their value from their social use’ 
(2009, p. 103). Developing a similar view within cultural-historical theory, Mahn 
and John-Steiner (2002) understand emotions as co-constructions within 
relations and activities. Their research into educational activities shows how 
building relations of mutual support and trust among students and teachers can 
create greater confidence in students and help them overcome fear of failure and 
various anxieties – especially over expressing their ideas in writing. Attention to 
creating caring and supportive relationships therefore influences how students 
feel about themselves and their work. However, the influence of this is not 
generalised for all students, for the relationships and activities are perceived and 
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appropriated differently by each person, depending on their own past life 
experiences – something Vygotsky referred to with the concept perezhivanie 
(Mahn and John-Steiner, 2002; González Rey, 2012; Fleer et al., 2017). Even then, 
emotions are integral to actions that take place in social activities. 
Thus, as Ratner (2000) says, these socially constructed emotions in humans 
either modify natural processes by incorporating them into a new socially 
formed psychological process, or they are new psychological processes that have 
no natural basis. For example, an emotion such as fear is often represented in 
terms of the fight/flight reactions that occur as an automatic response upon the 
perception of a startling occurrence. But as Barbalet (1998) points out, in the 
social world the source of fear is often the structured insufficiencies of power 
that leave people feeling vulnerable or at risk, such as fear of losing your job, 
income, and home. Furthermore, the fear caused by insufficiencies of power has 
a totally different feel to it than the fight/flight reactions and is not based on 
these physiological responses. Instead, this form of fear motivates very different 
actions that are social and political in nature, like people acting collectively to 
address the sources of vulnerability and shore up their interests and sense of 
security. In this way, for Barbalet, all the emotions are directly implicated in 
social action and in agents’ transformation of their social world. For example, 
inequalities of wealth that create insecurity and fear can be challenged through 
political parties and movements, and trade unions fight for better wages, 
working conditions, and job security. 
Similarly, how emotions are structured and organised by activities mediated by 
symbolic and linguistic means, can be seen in the way that poets and writers 
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create and articulate new emotions such as anxiety and dread. Philosophers and 
novelists in the mid-twentieth century did much to articulate and make real the 
sense of anxiety that many felt in the face of war, the threat of nuclear 
annihilation, and the growing sense of social isolation, especially in urban 
environments. This was not simply an intellectual or artistic abstraction: an 
author like Sartre (1965) actually put a physical feeling to alienation and anxiety 
in his novel Nausea: a sense of sickness and vertigo that comes from the feeling 
of living in a world that is alien and inhuman. Such existential novels and 
philosophical works became popular in the 1950s and 60s, picking up on what 
Raymond Williams (1977) called a ‘structure of feeling’ – a vague and intangible 
feeling of social change among people that is given articulation by artists, so that 
it becomes more concrete and tangible. In this case, anxiety – which is often 
described as an objectless fear – was given concrete form by writers like Sartre 
and expressed the structure of feeling of a new generation who were rejecting 
the way of life of their parents, especially their perceived conformity to 
established social and political authority and their acceptance of social norms 
that were felt to be repressive and outmoded, stifling self-expression. A wave of 
‘kitchen sink dramas’ were created in Britain in the late 1950s to express the 
feelings of ‘angry young men’, such as John Osborne’s Look Back in Anger, in 
which a central character (usually male) expressed their anger and distress at 
feeling out of place in their jobs, traditional domestic roles, and the 
predetermined nature of their future life trajectory. 
However, as Sartre’s example of nausea shows, socially created emotions have a 
bodily, feeling element to them because they are integral to actions. Thus, 
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Ratner’s (2000) cognitive theory of emotion as a schema-based appraisal of 
situations gives no significance to the embodiment of emotion, assigning this to 
an unspecified arousal (Holodynski, 2013). Instead, emotions as integral to 
action always have some element of bodily feeling to them. As Cromby (2007) 
points out, emotions are themselves feelings, in that we feel anger, joy, shame, or 
love: it is just that feelings are a broader category that apply also to non-
emotional feelings, such as hunger or thirst, and to the bodily feelings that are 
associated with emotions, like the raised heartbeat and adrenaline rush 
associated with fear or excitement. William James (1971) claimed that without 
these bodily feelings our experience of emotion would be a pale shadow, a mere 
concept of an emotion rather than one we are actually feeling. James also pointed 
out that all our actions are accompanied by feelings, like for example the 
expressive utterance we put into words such as ‘and’, ‘if’ or ‘but’. ‘And’ can be 
said with an impatient intonation, as when we are hurrying someone to a 
conclusion, or with a drawn-out intonation when we are communicating to 
someone we are about to add something of significance to what we are saying. 
Feelings, then, are not to be thought of in the way Damasio (2000) 
conceptualises them, as the conscious awareness of emotions that are induced by 
brain processes, triggered by the competent stimulus. Rather, feelings are the 
emergent consciousness of our meaningful relationship to others, to events, 
objects, or ends within our activities that we articulate in verbal utterances, or in 
learned bodily gestures and facial expressions. For Dewey (1958), the distinction 
between feelings and emotions are essentially experiential and linguistic: some 
experiences we refer to as feelings, such as having a sense of caution or being 
nervous on an occasion, while others we refer to as emotions, like when we are 
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angry, sad, or in love. In this way, both emotions and feelings can be seen as 
complexes composed of bodily perceptions that are structured and organised by 
meaningful social activity (Burkitt, 2014). 
Thus if we think of emotion not in terms of a behavioural response to a stimuli 
but, as Luria (1973) said about movement, as an intentional kinetic bodily logos 
oriented by symbolic social meanings and activities, then it is this that structures 
both emotion and feeling. Furthermore, as the work of Leontyev showed, it is not 
simply movement that concerns us in terms of human activity, but operations 
that allow us to perform particular actions in which both emotion and practical 
reason are integral (Roth, 2007). Thus feeling and emotion is shaped in activity 
that expresses both social meanings and the more personal sense of an act. An 
example of this is the way that Bakhtin (1990) talks about the emotional-
evaluative tones contained in a person’s utterance or in the stance they take in 
an action. That is to say, how a person expresses themself in their action or 
speech always contains an emotional evaluation of things, others, one’s own self, 
or what is happening in the situation, an evaluation that expresses both social 
and personal value (in Bakhtin’s terms it is ‘axiological’). An emotional-
evaluative utterance, then, is not primarily cognitive but is also bodily, in that it 
is expressed in tone of voice, facial expressions, gestures, or movements. 
However, the point I want to make here is that the social and personal meaning 
that shapes emotion does not simply change the outward expression of a 
neurobiological hard-wired response, which becomes feeling when it is 
recognised by consciousness. Rather, social and personal meaning shapes the 
entirety of emotion and feeling, both bodily and cognitively, as it is formed in 
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activity. In a world of symbolic meaning, speech and other bodily acts do not 
express a prior emotional experience. Instead, social relations, activity, and 
meaning are the structuring framework in the complex of symbolic and 
biological forms in which emotion is created. 
 
6. Conclusion 
What I have been arguing here is that the behavioural and cognitive model of 
action and emotion found in some contemporary and popular accounts of 
emotion is no longer sustainable in emotion studies. This is because, historically 
and globally, human cultures take the lead in reorganising and restructuring 
bodily sensations into symbolically and linguistically specific feelings and 
emotions. The latter operate at a different level to the irritability of simple 
organisms or the sensate actions of life forms whose behaviour is largely 
inherited. Under the influence of cultural and historical formations the bodily 
kinaesthetic logos is directed by intentional, meaningful social activity, and, in 
the process, dynamical brain systems are formed by the use of symbols and 
language in activity. Emotion is therefore not primary in all organisms. Instead, 
irritability becomes sensation in the more complex activity of certain organisms 
as they adapt to a more variable environmental niche, leading organisms 
themselves to become more complex with more defined yet coordinated bodily 
sensations. For humans who live in a social and cultural world, the development 
of perception, intellect, feeling, and emotion takes place through the assimilation 
of an extrinsic cultural heritage, and through the active mastery of technologies, 
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symbols, knowledge, and language. Intentional social activity, social meanings, 
and symbols do not simply change the expression and meaning of biologically 
inherited emotions. Instead, social and cultural inheritance creates feeling and 
emotion through the organisation of bodily activity – the kinaesthetic bodily 
logos – in the processes reforming neurobiology in terms of dynamical brain 
systems that are shaped in ontogenetic development. Emotions are therefore 
recent in their origin, appearing differentially across cultures with the various 
social and historical expressions of what it is to be human. 
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